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PLACENTOPHAGY: A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO HER PLACENTA 
Amber Goeden* 
Placentophagy is the consumption of the placenta after childbirth. 
While not every woman participates in placentophagy, there has been a 
notable increase of the practice. Many reasons exist in why woman partake 
in placentophagy. The most notable reasons for the growth, is the claimed 
increased breast milk production and the potential for reducing the effects of 
post-partum depression. Even though a woman might choose to partake in 
placentophagy, she might be met with law, or the lack thereof, that restricts 
her access to her placenta. 
Due to the increased requests for the placenta it has highlighted that a 
woman’s right to her placenta is undefined, except in three states. This Article 
examines the history of placentophagy, benefits of the practice, existing 
property rights regarding excised tissue and the regulations surrounding 
these rights, ultimately ending with a solution to the issue: limited property 
rights should be awarded to women who would like to take possession of their 
placentas after childbirth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Placentophagy, the consumption of one’s own placenta,1 has recently 
seen increased recognition from celebrities and advocates due to claims of 
reduced postpartum depression and increased breast milk production.2 This 
once taboo practice is making a comeback in modern society. The main 
obstacle for the pregnant woman who wishes to take this homeopathic 
approach is, surprisingly, the law. 
For example, Jordan Theiring, a Mississippi woman, wanted to 
partake in placentophagy after the birth of her child, but the Mississippi 
Department of Health and Welfare told her that she was a “third party” to her 
placenta and would need a court order to take it home.3 This is not an isolated 
circumstance; in fact, many women interested in engaging in placentophagy 
find themselves similarly situated.4 Women are being told by their physicians 
or hospitals that it is simply not an option or are met with court order 
                                                 
1 The consumption of the placenta can be achieved in a multitude of ways. Cynthia W. Coyle 
et al., Placentophagy: Therapeutic Miracle or Myth?, 18 ARCH WOMENS MENTAL HEALTH 
673, 674 (2015).  The main source of consumption at this time is through the encapsulation 
process. Id. The process entails preparing the placenta through dehydration—sterilized or 
not—and then grinding it to fill dissolvable capsules. Id.  Encapsulation can be performed 
by the woman, a service that comes to the home, or an entity that performs it off site. Id. 
Other forms of preparation include eating it raw right after birth, adding it to a smoothie type 
drink, or preparing it in a stir-fry meal. James Spratt, Cooking Up Placenta, YOUTUBE (Oct. 
27, 2007), www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ceBxQSRLrg. The taste is compared to the iron 
taste of liver. Id.  
2 Coyle et al., supra note 1, at 673. 
3 WTLV Staff, Pregnant Mississippi Woman Wins Right to Her Placenta, FIRSTCOASTNEWS 
(June 1, 2016), http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/pregnant-mississippi-woman- 
wins-right-to-her-placenta/225974656?fb_comment_id=1139871049406911_11399171360 
68969?fb_comment_id=1139871049406911_1139917136068969. 
4 Jodi Selander, Getting Your Placenta Released From the Hospital and Your Rights, 
WOMBART, http://www.wombmart.com/hospital-placenta-release (last visited Feb. 17,  
2018).  
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requirements. Sometimes the physician disregards hospital policy and may 
release a woman’s placenta to her. Other women go so far as to take their 
own placentas without the knowledge of the physicians or hospitals.5 
Most women would be stunned to discover that the law does not 
consider a piece of their body to be their property, and they legally have 
almost no voice regarding the use of their own placentas. The increasing 
number of women requesting their own placentas to engage in placentophagy 
is illuminating this important legal issue.6  
Establishing property rights in the placenta would allow unburdened 
access for the woman. However, it is important to recognize that full property 
rights in the placenta do have the potential for harmful societal consequences. 
To minimize those consequences, a carve out in federal regulations,7 further 
enactment of state statutes,8 or hospital policies must also be considered to 
minimally restrain those property rights while still allowing access to the 
placenta.  
Part I will discuss a short history of placentophagy, other cultural 
practices associated with the placenta, and the potential health benefits of 
placentophagy. In Part II, this Article will analyze the implications of 
existing property laws on tissue, cells, and blood. Part III will examine 
existing regulations of federal and state statutes that affect the handling and 
use of the placenta. Finally, Part IV will develop a solution to allow women 
the right to access their placentas by granting property rights and suggesting 
a carve out to the already existing regulations. 
I. HISTORY AND HEALTH BENEFITS OF PLACENTOPHAGY 
While the history of placentophagy is not well documented, it is 
believed to be a centuries-old practice embraced by many cultures.9 This 
                                                 
5 Carrie Feibel, Texas Defends A Woman’s Right To Take Her Placenta Home, NPR (June 
28, 2015 2:25 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/06/28/414836758/texas-
defends-a-womans-right-to-take-her-placenta-home. 
6 Rebecca N. Baergen et al., Placental Release or Disposal? Experiences of Perinatal 
Pathologists, PEDIATRIC & DEV. PATHOLOGY 327, 329 (2013).  
7 A carve out, versus a new regulation, would allow for a more efficient way to promote the 
exception.  By being located within the original regulation, its accessibility might promote a 
higher compliance rate due to affected hospital employers knowing of the existing regulation.  
8 At time of publication, Hawaii, Oregon, and Texas have clear, pro-placentophagy statutes 
allowing women to take custody of their placentas.  
9 See William B. Ober, Notes on Placentophagy, 55 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 591, 594 
(1979).  
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section will explore the history of placentophagy and consider some of the 
reputed health benefits. 
A. History of Placentophagy 
A handful of professionals have documented their knowledge and 
ideas about placentophagy. In a 1902 issue of the British Medical Journal, 
the author ponders the question of human placentophagy.10 He asserts that 
tribes with “no manners and whose customs are objectionable” are the ones 
who predominately practice it, specifically pointing to a recording in 1719 
where a “Yakouts”11 father and son ceremonially ate the placenta.12 
Providing further evidence of placentophagy, he considers a report from an 
Algerian physician in January of 1902.13 The physician states that 
placentophagy is practiced in parts of Sudan, but the “peasantry of Morocco 
and Algiers know nothing of it.”14  Reports like these provide evidence that 
placentophagy was practiced within many cultures, but its advertisement was 
kept minimal.  Another medical journal reports multiple possible instances of 
placentophagy, but the article relies on minimal concrete documentation, and 
instead reports on a physician’s experience and the author’s interpretation of 
text.15  
William Ober, M.D., reporting in the Bulletin of New York Academy 
of Medicine, became inquisitive about the history of placentophagy and 
sought to further investigate.16 His inquisition began after learning of the 
existence of placentophagy through a letter from a physician, which 
described an interaction with a Czechoslovakian nurse–midwife at a Vietnam 
hospital.17 The Czechoslovakian nurse–midwife informed the physician of 
the practice of placentophagy by the other nurse–midwives from the Chinese 
and Thai mountain tribes.18 The Czechoslovakian midwife explained that the 
                                                 
10 Placentophagy and Placental Opotherapy, 1 BRITISH MED. J. 909 (1902). 
11 The author states “Yakouts” but is most likely referring to the California Native American 
Tribe Yakot, as information on “Yakouts” was unobtainable.  
12 Placentophagy and Placental Opotherapy, supra note 10. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See Ober, supra note 9, at 591. 
16 Id. at 591–92. 
17 Id. at 591. At the beginning of the article the author refers to a “proposer,” but when the 
citation is referenced it is Ober himself to which he is referring. Id. 
18 Id. at 591–92. 
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Chinese and Thai nurse–midwife ritual consisted of eating the placenta, not 
from any mother, but only from their healthy, young, and beautiful patients.19 
Then the Czechoslovakian midwife proceeded to show the physician 
remnants of browned placenta in a frying pan.20 When the physician tried to 
obtain further information from the Vietnamese doctors, the doctors were 
reluctant to discuss the practice, as they were already aware of the 
apprehension the Czechoslovakian felt about the practice.21 The doctors even 
tried hiding the placentas and discouraging the tribal midwives from 
consuming them.22 
Ober also suggests that, in Deuteronomy, Chapter 28, the Bible 
encourages placentophagy: “If we accept the idea that Biblical imagery and 
metaphor reflect the culture of the time and place, it is reasonable to infer that 
the passage refers to a remote tribal memory, now suppressed, of a period 
when placentas were eaten, at least in times of famine.”23 Many years later, 
                                                 
19 Id. at 591. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 592. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. Ober’s conclusion comes from the Bible’s translated text, which reads as follows: 
The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not adventure to 
set the sole of her foot upon the ground... her eye shall be evil toward the 
husband of her bosom, and toward her daughter. And toward her young 
one that cometh out from between her feet, and toward her children which 
she shall bear; for she shall eat them for want of all things secretly in the 
siege and straitness.... 
Id. at 595.  Ober states that the translators of the Bible’s text relied on the “Targum of Aquila 
as their authority.” Id.  He continues on by employing the different Biblical languages to 
further translate meanings to prove the translation is correct. Id.  
In the Greek text the phrase ‘that cometh out from between her feet’ is 
written as chorion, and in the Vulgate it appears as secundinae partes, 
clearly the placenta. In Aramaic codices the phrase is u:ve-shilyatah, from 
the root shilya which means placenta, cf. uvishphir shilyeta (placenta and 
membranes) in the Targum of Jerusalem, which is translated as ‘that which 
issues forth from the place of shame at the time of birth.’  (For ‘the place 
of shame,’ cf. pudenda.) The 1917 translation of the Jewish Publication 
Society of America, based on the Masoretic text, correctly uses the word 
‘afterbirth.’ 
 Id. 
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Sharon M. Young and Daniel C. Benyshek became curious about the practice 
of placentophagy and tried to gain insight through a cross-cultural survey.24 
Researchers surveyed 179 societies in a cross-cultural study that 
resulted in only three separate reports of placentophagy: maternal, paternal, 
and infant placentophagy.25 The only identified culture that practiced 
maternal placentophagy was the Mexican-American culture.26 Unfortunately, 
the study could not prove whether it was an engrained cultural practice.27 
Two other cultures were noted to practice placentophagy. The Malekula of 
Melanesia practiced paternal placentophagy by having the new father eat a 
pudding made from the placenta and blood.28 The Gullah practiced infant 
placentophagy if the placenta covered the baby’s face at birth.29 They would 
take the placenta and make a tea, which then would be given to the baby.30 
The same cross-cultural study identified instances where the placenta 
was valued and used for purposes other than eating.31 The most common 
cross-cultural uses of the placenta pertain to disposal.32 Fifty-five percent of 
cultures reported burying the placenta, sometimes in specified locations 
important to the birth or family and other times in unspecified locations.33 
Other cultures varied the disposal based on their cultural beliefs about the 
placenta and what it represents.34 Most cultures that purposely dispose of the 
placenta believe that the treatment of the placenta can “alter or predict the 
future.”35 
                                                 
24 See generally Sharon M. Young & Daniel C. Benyshek, In Search of Human  
Placentophagy: A Cross-Cultural Survey of Human Placenta Consumption, Disposal  
Practices, and Cultural Beliefs, ECOLOGY FOOD & NUTRITION 467 (2010). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 472.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Gullah is a culture comprised of direct decedents of the West African slaves of the 1700s 
that were forced to work in the Carolinas and Georgia rice patties, cotton, and indigo fields. 
Adeline Chen & Teo Kermeliotis, African Slave Traditions Live on in U.S., CNN (Dec. 10, 
2012 12:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/07/world/africa/gullah-geechee-africa-slave 
ry-america/. 
30 Young & Benyshek, supra note 24, at 472.  
31 Id. at 473. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
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The second most common ideology related to the placenta is the 
implication of human qualities or a close connection to the child through a 
“name or description of the placenta.”36 Some of the names for the placenta 
in different cultures include sibling, mother, grandmother, parent, blanket, 
house, or skin; the placenta is also often associated with the child’s spirit 
double.37 In light of the strong cultural presence regarding the disposal of the 
placenta, researchers are perplexed as to why there is not more of a presence 
regarding the practice of maternal placentophagy.38 
Some researchers speculate that societies’ or outsider’s perception of 
engaging in placentophagy might be the reason cultures are apprehensive to 
reveal the practice.39 Many may have viewed it as taboo because of its close 
relation to cannibalism,40 although researchers find this peculiar, since there 
is evidence of cultures practicing cannibalism.41 Another theory is that 
obstetrician practices were considered a natural event and were therefore not 
recorded by historians or, if recorded, were superficial and inaccurate.42 In 
addition, due to patriarchy-dominated society and out of superstition, the 
birthing process often involved only women.43 Although there is limited 
recorded historical presence of placentophagy, it has been connected with 
providing health benefits.44 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 479–80. 
38 Id. at 481. 
39 See Ober, supra note 9. 
40 Even with a negative cultural view of cannibalism, it is not illegal to partake in 
cannibalism, which is also known as anthropophagy. Carmen M. Cusack, Placentophagy 
and Embrophagy: An Analysis of Social Deviance within Gender, Families or the Home 
(Etude 1), 1 LSD J. 112, 115 (2011). Idaho is the only state that bans anthropophagy 
(consumption of human tissue or blood). Id. at 117–18. Cusack argues that the Idaho statute 
would be unconstitutionally broad and inapplicable to adults through a Lawrence v. Texas 
analysis. Id. at 124–29. She reasons that prosecuting the performance of a sexual act, i.e. 
“cunnilingus, involving the consumption of healthy menses,” would violate privacy rights, 
since there is no legitimate state interest in regulating the act. Id. at 127. 
41 Gwendolyn E. Cremers & Kathryn Graff Low, Attitudes Toward Placentophagy: A Brief 
Report, HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 113, 118 (2014). 
42 Ober, supra note 9, at 592. 
43 Id. 
44 See generally Placentophagy & Placenta Optherapy, supra note 10; Jodi Selander et al., 
Human Maternal Placentophagy: A Survey of Self-Reported Motivations and Experiences 
Associated with Placenta Consumption, ECOLOGY FOOD & NUTRITION 93, 104 (2013). 
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B. Health Benefits of Placentophagy 
The two health benefits of placentophagy that are reported most often 
are reduced postpartum depression and increased breast milk production.45 
Unfortunately, even with these self-reported health benefits, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence to support these claims.46 Researchers are skeptical about 
unsupported claims that are tantamount to nothing more than anecdotal tales. 
Their skepticism stems from a number of factors, including the lack of control 
groups, stringent standards regarding the dosage of the placenta and timing 
of consumption, review of milk production, and signs of postpartum 
depression.47 
In the absence of empirical results, however, self-reported benefits 
should not be dismissed. Research based on a self-reporting survey indicates 
that, of 189 women who partook in placentophagy, 40% experienced 
enhanced mood and 15% experienced improved milk production.48 The 
remaining 45% experienced other positive side effects, such as increased 
energy, reduced postpartum bleeding, and other positive bodily functions.49 
Ninety-eight percent of the 189 women indicated they would engage in 
placentophagy again.50 To appreciate the health benefits of placentophagy, it 
is helpful to understand the composition and purpose of the placenta. 
The placenta is a barrier that keeps the baby separate from the 
woman’s own biological system and acts similar to the kidney.51 It filters the 
blood and fluids before delivering them to the baby through membranous 
transport.52 The filtering process enriches the placenta with vitamins, 
minerals, and hormones.53 Advocates state that consumption of the placenta 
                                                 
45 Marisa E. Marraccini & Kathleen S. Gorman, Exploring Placentophagy in Humans:  
Problems and Recommendations, 60 J. MIDWIFERY WOMEN’S HEALTH 371, 375 (2015). 
46 Cremers & Low, supra note 41, at 115. 
47 Coyle et al., supra note 1, at 675–76 (demonstrating that the main category comparisons 
are between placentophagy and effects on postpartum depression and milk production). 
48 Id. (Enhanced mood is referring to “improved mood (i.e., alleviated symptoms of the baby 
blues or a mood disorder, or otherwise alleviated mood)”). 
49 Id. at 104. 
50 Id. at 105. 
51 Michael Rindler, Fertilization and Placenta, http://education.med.nyu.edu/courses/macro 
structure/lectures/ lec_images/placenta.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2018). 
52 Nova Science Publishers, Inc., THE PLACENTA: DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTION AND DISEASES 
11 (2013). 
53 Sharon Schwartz, Maternal Placentophagy as an Alternative Medicinal Practice in the 
Postpartum Period, MIDWIFERY TODAY 28, 28 (2014). 
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replenishes the woman’s depleted vitamin and hormone levels, which are 
drastically and quickly depleted following the birth of the placenta and 
child.54 The lack of hormones, coupled with the stressful situation that is 
childbirth, can exacerbate the onset of postpartum depression.55 By partaking 
in placentophagy, the woman can swiftly replenish her vitamins and hormone 
levels.56  
Consumption of the placenta also affects breast milk supply.57 
Researchers theorize that, when the placenta is consumed, the “placental 
lactogen, similar in structure to prolactin, binds to prolactin receptor sites 
stimulating mammary cells and thus increasing milk production.”58 A study 
conducted in 1954 saw an increase in milk production through the 
consumption of the placenta.59 During the study, a beef-placebo was given to 
some new mothers, while others received actual placenta.60 The placenta-fed 
mothers showed a milk increase of 86.2%, while the beef-fed mothers 
showed a 33% increase of milk production.61 This research is criticized 
because the standards surrounding human subjects62 had not been 
implemented when the study was conducted.63 
Another study in 1902 was conducted to determine if there was an 
increase in breast milk production through placentophagy.64 While it did not 
hypothesize the same placental-lactogen-binding theory as above, it provides 
another supportive example of placentophagy’s benefits. The 1902 British 
Medical Journal reported an increase in breast milk production, but this time 
sheep placenta was used in the test.65 The placental juices were used to make 









62 When conducting research using human subjects, researches are required to abide by very 
stringent standards promulgated by Health and Human Services, which oversees research 
conducted by hospitals. Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions - 
Information Sheet, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInforma 
tion/Guidances/ucm126420.htm (last vistied Feb. 17, 2018). 
63 Schwartz, supra note 53. 
64 Placentophagy & Placental Opotherapy, supra note 10, at 909.  
65 Id. 
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syrup, which was given to patients in a birthing ward.66 Most patients saw an 
increase in milk production.67 The syrup was also given to two patients who 
were experiencing painful menstruation cycles but were not postpartum.68 
One woman reportedly obtained relief from her cycle, while both (one had 
one child and the other had no children) apparently secreted milk as well.69 
Researchers would likely also criticize this study. Regardless, it 
supports the hypothesis that there is a relationship between consuming 
placenta and milk production. The lack of empirical evidence established 
through modern research practices, while noteworthy, should not discount 
the existing evidence of placentophageal benefits. A woman’s reason for 
engaging in placentophagy is personal and property rights should not be 
determined by the lack of empirical evidence, especially if the right is not 
harmful to the woman or her baby. Likewise, many naturopathy practices do 
not have definitive results about their benefits, yet many people use the 
practices and report benefits.70  
Placentophagy has been practiced for hundreds of years by a variety 
of cultures. The purposes and benefits may not have been clear in the past, 
but they are more so now. Women engage in placentophagy to help reduce 
postpartum symptoms and increase milk production. Even with minimal 
empirical evidence and the understanding that additional research for 
definitive answers may still be required, property law should still adapt to 
allow the woman greater placental control.71 Additionally, outside of 
placentophagy, many cultures have used and still use the placenta for other 
cultural purposes. There is enough history and support to determine that the 
placenta has significant value, which is why women seek to control it after 
birth. Recognizing this value makes granting ownership rights in the placenta 
a logical step. 
                                                 
66 Id.(stating “M. Bouchacourt reports M. Brindeau’s experience and a series of cases in 
Professor Tarnier’s wards,” which presumably this ward would be like a modern labor and 




70 Other naturopathic treatments include acupuncture for fertility, cupping for muscle 
performance, acupuncture for cancer treatments, etc.  
71 Coyle et al., supra note 1, at 678.  
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II. PROPERTY LAW 
Despite the historical significance of placentophagy and its claimed 
health benefits, it is difficult for women to access their own placenta after 
childbirth. This raises a legal issue. What rights, if any, does a woman have 
in her placenta after it has been delivered? This question is answered in the 
following section. 
A. Background of Property Rights 
While a general rule of “its mine, not yours” seems appropriate under 
property law, it is not that simple.72 A property right is not spontaneously 
created when a person decides to control an object. For property rights in an 
object to be granted, a justification for the right to control must first be 
determined.73 Property rights are not inherent but are rather created through 
human invention based upon reason and are justified by applying a number 
of theories: first occupation/possession, labor/desert, utilitarianism, civil 
republican, and personhood.74 
First occupation is the most basic principle of property law: the “first 
person to possess an object is its owner.”75 The labor/desert principle 
provides that, through “a person’s work,” a person creates a private property 
right.76 For example, if a person cultivates a field through plowing, planting 
seeds, picking weeds, and harvesting a crop, a property interest would vest in 
the crops yielded. Utilitarianism, based on Jeremy Bentham’s theory, is the 
promotion of the welfare of the citizens.77 Promoting welfare allocates rights 
to “maximize human satisfaction or benefit.”78 For this principle, allowing 
people certain benefits that make them happy in turn benefits society as a 
whole.79 Civil republican theory promotes “economic security necessary to 
                                                 
72 Vincent Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 297, 
313 (2009). 
73 JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND G. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY 
 APPROACH 2 (3rd ed. 2015). 
74 SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 74, at 2–8. 
75 Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary, First Possession Beyond the Law: Adults’ and Young 
Children’s Intuition about Ownership, 83 TUL. L. REV. 679, 680 (2009).   
76 Stephen Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord Blood for 
Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 498 (1999). 
77 SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 74, at 4. 
78 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but is it Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal 
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 498 (2003). 
79 SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 74, at 4–5. 
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make political decisions to serve the common good.”80 This principle stems 
from England, when the people who held land were the ones with the most 
political clout.81 Finally, the personhood principle is the acknowledgment 
that certain property promotes a person’s individual development.82 To 
achieve proper self-development, a person “needs some control over 
resources in the external environment.”83 These principles affect the 
justification of property rights. Property rights are created in an object based 
on these justifications. The next question is what these “rights” look like and 
how they are controlled. 
Property rights are characterized as a “bundle of sticks.”84 Each 
“stick” is correlated to an individual property right.85 The rights to use or 
possess, exclude, transfer, enjoy the fruits or profits, or destroy an object are 
individual “sticks.”86 It is common in property law to have limitations in the 
property owner’s rights, but “no consensus exists regarding what is sufficient 
to constitute the minimal bundle of rights necessary for ‘property.’”87 In other 
words, if an owner is narrowly limited in her use of some of the individual 
rights, does she really have any property right in the object? At this point, 
there appears to be no clear answer. But when there is a question of limitation 
or expansion of the property rights, the courts determine the acceptable 
latitude of rights.88 Yet even the courts are undecided when examining 
property interests in human cells: “Few courts have adjudicated the scope of 
property interests in human cells, and those that have examined the issue are 
divided sharply.”89 
                                                 
80 Id. at 6. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 7. 
83 Bergelson, supra note 79, 429–30. 
84 Phillip Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 224–25 
(1996). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 225. 
87 Id. at 224–25. 
88 See e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 423–24 (E.D. Va. 1989); Moore v. Regents of 
University of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480–81 (Cal. 1990); Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 
4th 836, 839 (1993). 
89 Jennifer Long Collins, Hecht v. Superior Court: Recognizing a Property Right in 
Reproductive Material, 33. U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 661, 663 n.17 (1995). 
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B. Attempted Claim to Property Rights 
One court that has addressed those property interests is the California 
Supreme Court; in Moore v. Regents University of California, the court had 
to determine if property rights existed in tissue and cells, and if so, how 
limited were those rights.90 Moore was the first case to decide that individuals 
do not have a property interest in their excised cells.91 The plaintiff, John 
Moore, had been diagnosed with a form of leukemia and consulted the 
defendant, Dr. Golde, who confirmed the diagnosis.92 To slow Moore’s 
disease, Dr. Golde recommended that Moore have his spleen removed, and 
Moore consented.93 However, Moore was unaware of Dr. Golde’s preexisting 
research at the time he consented, and was further unaware that there was 
potential for financial gain resulting from the use of the tissues.94 The tissues 
from Moore’s spleen and vials of blood taken during procedures eventually 
allowed Dr. Golde to create a cell line, which was later patented.95 Moore 
brought suit against Dr. Golde for breach of fiduciary duty, claiming Dr. 
Golde’s failure to disclose material information resulted in an invalid 
informed consent.96 Moore also claimed a conversion of his cells.97 The issue 
most relevant to property rights in excised tissue and cells, and therefore to 
this Article, is the alleged conversion of the cells. 
The majority opinion very briefly discussed the idea of property rights 
in the cells, but quickly disposed of the idea because of existing disposal 
regulations for tissue, cells, and blood: 
[R]esearch [does not] disclose[] a case holding that a person 
retains a sufficient interest in excised cells to support a cause 
of action for conversion. We do not find this surprising, since 
the laws governing such things as human tissues, 
transplantable organs, blood, fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal 
tissue, and dead bodies deal with human biological materials 
as objects sui generis [unique or different than the normal], 
regulating their disposition to achieve policy goals rather than 
                                                 
90 Moore, 793 P.2d at 487. 
91 Id. at  492. 
92 Id. at 480–81. 
93 Id. at 481. 
94 Id. at 480.  
95 Id. at 481–82. 
96 Id. at 482–83. 
97 Id. at 482–83. 
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abandoning them to the general law of personal property. It is 
these specialized statutes, not the law of conversion, to which 
courts ordinarily should and do look for guidance on the 
disposition of human biological materials.98 
However, some argue that Moore incorrectly disregarded the property 
interest in excised tissue, cells, and blood.99 Even though there are standards 
to regulate the handling of the material, such standards do not negate an 
interest in the material.100 It is illogical to say that a person no longer retains 
rights over part of her body just because it has been excised.101 State statutes 
should not trump personal control over one’s body parts. 
Justice Mosk’s dissent addressed the issue of property right in the 
excised tissue and cells. He emphasized that property laws are a broad and 
abstract application and that it is more appropriate to refer to the “bundle of 
sticks” the object possesses instead of referring directly to the object.102 
Justice Mosk recognized that the “bundle of sticks” can be limited, but 
limitation does not disintegrate the property interest.103 Applying this 
principle to Moore’s tissue and cells, Justice Mosk explained: 
Moore nevertheless retained valuable rights in that tissue. 
Above all, at the time of its excision he at least had the right 
to do with his own tissue whatever the defendants did with it: 
i.e., he could have contracted with researchers and 
                                                 
98 Id. at 489 (footnotes omitted). 
99 Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personality: Toward a Property Right in Human 
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 238 (1990). 
100 Ducor, supra note 87, at 251.  
101 When tissue, organs, and cells have yet to be excised, they are considered to be part of a 
person and not property.  The public policy argument is if tissue, organs, and cells are 
classified as property while still inside of a person, the law would inevitably classify a person 
as a whole as property. Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing 
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207, 224–25 
(1986). The court in Moore addressed several public policy interests that this property right 
would hinder. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493–94. This is a crime against human dignity, as there 
would be “control” over the body much like slavery. Once the tissue leaves the body the 
level of control changes. The person can either determine whether a medical entity or 
physician can use the tissue or cells for research or just allow disposal of them, but nothing 
more.  Id. at 491–92. 
102 Moore, 793 P.2d at 509 (Mosk, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 510. 
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pharmaceutical companies to develop and exploit the vast 
commercial potential of his tissue and its products.104 
Justice Mosk rebutted the majority’s argument that no other case has 
granted property rights in a person’s excised cells.105 He also observed that 
no cases have stated a person cannot obtain a property right in one’s own 
body parts.106 This provides an excellent reminder that Moore is not an 
authoritative source, except in California. While Moore is still persuasive, it 
is not the final word on whether property rights exist in excised cells. 
C. Property Rights of Genetic Material 
As stated, courts have been inconsistent in recognizing property rights 
in tissue and cells. Before Moore was decided, the Eastern District Court of 
Virginia granted quasi-property rights in an embryo.107 After Moore, the 
Second District Court of Appeals in California also granted quasi-property 
rights in sperm.108 
 In York v. Jones, a husband and wife brought a claim against an in-
vitro fertility clinic where they were receiving treatment seeking the release 
of an embryo to be transported to another facility.109 Since a contract was 
made between the facility and the couple, the court relied on the contract to 
find a bailor-bailee relationship.110 When a bailment relationship is created, 
there is an absolute obligation to return the property upon cessation of the 
relationship.111 The court referenced the contract language characterizing the 
embryo as being property of the couple, but ultimately decided the case based 
on the bailment relationship and did not further discuss the property rights in 
the embryo.112 
A similar case outcome occurred in California, this time in reference 
to sperm.113 Deborah Hecht filed a preemptory writ of mandate to stay a 
California Trial Court’s Order to destroy 15 vials of sperm granted to her in 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 507. 
106 Id. 
107 York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421, 423–24 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
108 Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 839 (1993). 
109 York, 717 F.Supp. at 423–24.  
110 Id. at 425. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 426–27. 
113 Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 839. 
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her boyfriend’s will.114 William Kane had willed the vials to Hecht in hopes 
that she would still have his child after his death.115 Kane’s adult children 
entered the suit as interested parties to prevent the birth of a child that would 
never know their father and to prevent the disruption the unborn child would 
have caused in the existing families’ lives.116 The children urged the appellate 
court to uphold the trial court’s order based on Moore; if the sperm were not 
considered property, then it would not be distributable under the probate 
code.117 The court rejected this argument and determined that, if property 
rights do not govern the semen, it deserved a special category due to the 
potential of human life, and the court classified the sperm to be “sufficient to 
constitute ‘property’ within the meaning” of the probate code.118 
The court also stated that the “decedent had an interest, in the nature 
of the ownership, to the extent that he had decision making authority to the 
sperm within the scope of policy set by the law.”119 The court used York and 
The American Fertility Society as guidance to articulate that donors have the 
right to decide the disposition of gamete material.120 It also discussed Davis 
v. Davis, which allowed a quasi-property interest in the ownership of a 
preembryo because it was due “greater respect than other human tissue 
because of its potential to become a person and because of its symbolic 
meaning for many people.”121 The Hecht court then declined to direct the trial 
court to distribute the sperm to Hecht because of unresolved matters.122 On 
remand, the trial court eventually gave Hecht 20% of the sperm, based on a 
secondary agreement of the contested will.123 Thus, it appears courts are 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 840. 
116 Id. at 844. 
117 Id. at 846. 
118 Id. at 850. The applicable California probate code classifies property as “anything that 
may be the subject of ownership and includes both real and personal property and any interest 
therein.” CA. PROB. CODE § 62 (West 2016).  
119 Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th, at 846. 
120 Id. at 848. Gamete material referenced is the existence of an egg or sperm. 
121 Id. at 849–50.  
122 Id. at 852. 
123 Kane v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 1580–81 (1995) (“‘The balance of all 
assets over which the decedent had dominion or control or ownership, whether in the 
possession of Miss. Hecht, the children or any third party shall be subject to administration 
in the decedent's estate.’ The formula in the settlement agreement for distribution of assets 
provided ‘... [s]ums in excess of $190,000 net available for distribution will be distributed 
20% to Deborah Hecht, 40% to Katherine E. Kane and 40% to Everett.’”). 
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willing to explore the claim that tissue and cells outside of the body have the 
potential for possessing property rights, especially when it is evident the 
person intended to extend the rights to the tissue and cells. 
III. FEDERAL REGULATIONS, STATE STATUTES, AND HOSPITAL REGULATIONS 
ON GIVING PATIENTS THEIR EXCISED TISSUE 
Due to the regulations already enacted by federal and state statutes, 
some courts are willing to quickly dispose of rights to the tissue. Others have 
determined that the regulations are not enough to determine the possible 
rights involved. 
Assorted laws, ranging from federal statutes to state health 
organization regulations, govern the placenta.124 With the potential risk of 
spreading disease, many of these regulations were made to protect the 
public.125 A few states, while recognizing the potential hazard for spreading 
disease, have found a way to mitigate the risk while conceding a woman’s 
interest in obtaining her placenta.126 These states have enacted statutes 
allowing a woman to remove the placenta from hospital grounds without a 
court order.127 Laws that oversee the handling and disposition of the placenta 
will be further discussed throughout the section. 
A. Federal Regulations 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a 
federal agency, controls the handling of waste that is considered “regulated 
waste.”128  OSHA defines “regulated waste” as any waste that has the 
potential to leak, is caked in, or is liquid blood, semi-liquid blood, or other 
                                                 
124 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (2012); HAW. CODE R. § 11-104.1-34 (West 2016); OR. ADMIN. 
R. 333-056-0045 (2016); Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. § 172.002 (West 2015). 
125 These statutes address the spread of various infectous deseases as the main purpose for 
screening the woman’s placenta. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030; HAW. CODE R. § 11-
104.1-34; OR. ADMIN. R. 333-056-0045; Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. § 172.002. 
126 HAW. CODE R. § 11-104.1-34; OR. ADMIN. R. 333-056-0045; Tex. Health and Safety 
Code Ann. § 172.002. 
127 HAW. CODE R. § 11-104.1-34; OR. ADMIN. R. 333-056-0045; Tex. Health and Safety 
Code Ann. § 172.002. 
128 OSHA’s main purpose is to regulate Occupational Health and Safety Standards.  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.1030(b). 
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potentially infectious materials.129 As the placenta has the characteristics of 
being bloody, OSHA would govern handling procedures. 
For a facility that handles this type of material, the regulations provide 
specifications on the environment and “personal protective equipment” an 
employer must provide to the employee, direction on how the employee is 
supposed to package the waste, and procedures on what an employee should 
do if he or she were to come in contact with this type of material.130 OSHA 
requires these procedures to protect employees from specific infectious 
diseases—hepatitis B and HIV.131 However, when it comes to specificity on 
disposal of the material, OSHA refers back to federal and state statutes.132 
Interestingly enough, there are no federal regulations that cover the disposal 
of medical waste.133 The rational idea is that the Environmental Protection 
Agency would be the entity to create regulations on the disposal of medical 
waste, but that is not the case. This leaves the states to adopt their own 
regulations. 
B. State Statutes: Texas, Oregon, and Hawaii Medical Waste 
Exceptions Statutes 
Texas, Oregon, and Hawaii have already recognized a woman’s 
interest in her placenta.134 Each state has created statutory requirements, 
which, once met, allow a woman to take her placenta home. While these 
states agree that a woman should have access to her placenta, statutes vary 
between the states. 
Texas’ statute only requires a woman to meet a few statutory 
                                                 
129 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (“Regulated Waste means liquid or semi-liquid blood or other 
potentially infectious materials; contaminated items that would release blood or other 
potentially infectious materials in a liquid or semi-liquid state if compressed; items that are 
caked with dried blood or other potentially infectious materials and are capable of releasing 
these materials during handling; contaminated sharps; and pathological and microbiological 
wastes containing blood or other potentially infectious materials.”). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (defining bloodborne pathogens to include HIV and hepatitis B (HBV)). 
132 Id. at §1910.1030(d)(4)(iii)(C). 
133 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Self-Inspection Checklist, CDC 
(June 6, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2004-101/chklists/r1n79m~1.htm. 
134 Maryland has a state statute that implies there might be a possibility for the parents to 
obtain the placenta: it excludes under the chapter of disposal regulations (applicable to 
persons who treat and dispose of medical waste) “fetuses and placentas that are released to a 
funeral director or a parent.”  MD. CODE REGS. 10.06.06.01 (2016).  
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provisions.135 A woman must test negative for certain diseases, specifically 
syphilis, HIV, and hepatitis B,136 and acknowledge the placenta is only for 
personal use.137 Next, a woman may not interfere with a physician’s request 
to test the placenta through examination by pathology.138 The hospital has an 
obligation to obtain an acknowledgment form from the woman and note it in 
her chart.139 The form must indicate that the woman has received material 
about the proper care of the placenta, the risks of spreading blood-borne 
pathogens, and the risk of ingesting formalin.140 
While Texas provides less stringent standards than the other states, it 
accounts for protection of liability against the hospital and doctors. The 
physician-ordered placenta examination requirement exemplifies this.141 It 
allows a pediatrician to have a closer look at the placenta to confirm there is 
no damage that could affect the newborn, thus allowing the doctor to elude a 
potential malpractice suit.142 Another form of liabity protection in the statute 
provides that a hospital is not liable for a civil action, criminal procedure, or 
administrative proceeding when operating under the section.143 These 
portions of the statute do not appear in Oregon or Hawaii.144 It is apparent 
that Texas saw the possible repercussions of giving full access to a placenta 
without providing safety nets for the persons and entities involved. 
Oregon’s statutory regulation appears to closely follow OSHA’s 
infectious waste guidelines. It provides health care facilities and freestanding 
birthing centers the ability to enable a woman or designee to take her placenta 
home, provided that the facilities have a policy and procedure to ensure the 
safe management and transport of placentas.145 The facility must also possess 
records that the woman has tested negative for hepatitis B and HIV since the 
beginning of the pregnancy, that she is free from hepatitis C or not at risk for 
                                                 
135 Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. § 172.002. 
136 Id. at § 81.090. 
137 Id. at § 172.002. 
138 Id. at § 81.090(a)(1). 
139 Id. at § 172.002(a)(2). 
140 Id. at § 172.002(a)(2)(A). 
141 Id. at § 172.002. 
142 Id. at § 81.090(a-1). 
143 Id. at § 172.002(f). 
144 See HAW. CODE R. § 11-104.1-34; OR. ADMIN. R. 333-056-0045. 
145 OR. ADMIN. R. 333-056-0045. 
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it, and that she is free from any other infectious diseases.146 The woman must 
sign a form containing personal health information and agreeing that her 
placenta will not be used for commercial purposes.147 Finally, the woman 
must acknowledge that she is free from any diseases that may threaten those 
who handle the placenta.148 The medical center must keep a copy of the form 
in the mother’s medical record.149 The statute also gives authority to health 
care facilities to provide additional requirements for the removal of the 
placenta.150 
Hawaii’s statute requires similar testing to the Oregon statute.151 The 
health care facility is required to have a procedure developed for safe 
management and transport of the placenta following the OSHA guidelines.152 
A “release form must be signed by the mother, physician, and health care 
facility authority,” and a copy of the release form must be put in the patient’s 
chart while another copy is sent to the department.153 
C. Hospital Regulations 
Hospitals are regulated by multiple federal agencies: the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Health and Human Services (HHS), 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and OSHA, to name a 
few. OSHA’s regulations have a direct impact on the placenta and how a 
hospital is required to handle the material.154 Due to the multiple players 
providing oversight, hospitals are beginning to see a need to revise 
procedures regarding the handling of human tissue.155 Doctors are promising 
certain actions to patients, sometimes in contravention of hospital policy, or 
alternatively, the hospital may be unaware of the commitments made by 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 333-056-0045 (1)(c)(B). 
148 Id. at 333-056-0045 (1)(c)(C)(i). 
149 Id. at 333-056-0045 (2). 
150 Id. at 333-056-0045 (4). 
151 HAW. CODE R. § 11-104.1-34(a). 
152 Id. § 11-104.1-34(b). 
153 Id. § 11-104.1-34(d). 
154 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b). 
155 Stacey Meadows & Doreen Kornrumpf, Wrestling Over Human Tissue: Yours, Mine or 
Ours? 00:03:30, ARCHIVE.HEALTHLAWYERS.ORG, http://archive.healthlawyers.org/google/h 
ealth_law_archive/program_papers 2/2011_BIOMED /biomed_C.mp3 (last visited Feb. 17, 
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doctors and therefore unable to inform the patient otherwise.156 Hospitals’ 
general counsel do not think that it is appropriate to give tissue directly to 
patients due to preservation issues and infection risks.157 
There are certain procedures that a hospital must follow that affect the 
release of the placenta. Again, OSHA regulations would apply to the handling 
of the placenta.158 This might include sterilization, since the placenta falls 
into OSHA’s “regulated waste” category.159 A hospital also might send the 
placenta to pathology for inspection of any damage to the placenta.160 This 
allows the peditatrician to determine whether to provide medical care to a 
child who might not be exhibiting signs of damage. 
Overall, there is general regulation of the placenta because it is 
lumped together with other tissue and cells. However, the placenta is more 
than simply another tissue or cell that was excised from the body. Its excision 
was not due to illness or surgery, but due to birth. It is apparent that a property 
right needs to exist in the placenta so women can no longer be denied an 
interest they possess. The next section proposes a few different solutions in 
granting the rights a woman rightfully deserves in her placenta. 
IV. SOLUTION 
The ideal and most suitable solution to the problems discussed above 
would be to grant property rights in the placenta to the woman. Through the 
application of property rights, it is obvious that the right also comes with 
consequences. That is why this Article recommends a carve out in OSHA 
regulations. While giving women full access, it also protects the public and 
those who are a part of the process. This section discusses the solution in 
providing for property rights, as well as the consequences that might emerge. 
A. Justification of Property Rights in Placentas 
Through the application of property categories to the placenta, this 
Article will rebut Moore’s holding and other case precedent and will show 
substantial evidence that property rights should be allowed to vest in the 
placenta. As stated above, acknowledging full property rights in the placenta 
also comes with potential societal risks. To properly manage the risks there 
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159 See supra note 130. 
160 Baergen, supra note 6, at 328. 
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should be certain limitations or requirements on the possession of the 
placenta through federal regulation or state statutes. 
1. Application of property categories. Property rights are a 
human invention created through the justification of ownership in an 
object.161 A woman’s property rights in her excised placenta can be justified 
through the application of four of the five theories that give rise to property 
law: first possessor, labor/desert principle, utilitarianism, and personhood.162 
Usually identified as the most important justification, the first possessor 
theory lays the foundation that property rights should vest in the placenta.163 
A woman is the first possessor of the placenta. She has made a 
conscious decision to become pregnant or continue her pregnancy and grow 
a placenta to provide life support to the baby. When a woman decides to 
partake in placentophagy, she extends her interest in possession when she 
informs her physician or midwife of her desire to take possession of the 
placenta once it has been birthed. Based on the first and most basic property 
law, a first possessor of an object is the property right holder; therefore, the 
woman should possess the rights in her placenta. 
The labor/desert principle is applicable because the woman’s body 
labors to grow the placenta until the baby is born. A woman’s body 
transforms through the pregnancy and provides nutrients, hormones, and 
oxygen through the placenta to the baby. Again, when a woman decides and 
knows that she is going to have a baby, she does not idly sit by as the placenta 
grows, but she must actively participate in its growth. She is the reason for 
its growth. Through this process, she has invested her own labor in growing 
the placenta and birthing it after a baby. 
Placentophagy embodies the utilitarian theory, for the basis of the 
practice is the benefit to the wellbeing of the mother and child. Allowing 
property rights to vest in the placenta would maximize human satisfaction. If 
placentophagy were legalized, many women would not be reeling from the 
side effects of postpartum depression, nor would they have to endure a 
potentially drawn out process in trying to gain access to their placentas in the 
current system. 
Finally, by obtaining the placenta, it promotes a woman and child’s 
individual development, personifying the personhood category. One of the 
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162 Id. 
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main reasons a woman seeks to obtain her placenta is to participate in 
placentophagy in order to prevent suffering through postpartum depression. 
The suffering can greatly diminish a woman’s mental state and wellbeing. 
Through an individual choice to partake in placentophagy, the woman would 
be able to achieve self-development. Also, many families use the placenta for 
other rituals that are a part of their culture, which directly connects with 
personhood. If an attempt to gain the placenta in the modern system proved 
unsuccessful, it could negatively affect a woman’s wellbeing and her and her 
family’s cultural practices. Such negative effects directly affect the woman’s 
personhood. 
Considering the benefits of partaking in placentophagy and the 
application of the four property law justifications, there is enough evidence 
to prove that a property interest in the placenta would be beneficial to society. 
That benefit should provide enough justification to allow the woman to hold 
the “bundle of sticks” to placenta rights. Although some might argue that 
Moore’s holding could or should be applied to invalidate the justifications 
discussed above, it should not be applied to the placenta, for reasons 
discussed in the next section. 
2. Invalidity of the Moore holding. Moore was incorrectly 
decided and its holding should not apply to the placenta. In Moore, the 
court’s largest issue was the tort claim of conversion, due to the potential 
creation of personal fiduciary gain through a property interest in the excised 
tissue and cells.164 That issue is inapplicable to placentas: women are 
seeking to consume or dispose of their placentas according to cultural 
practices, and are not seeking to obtain monetary gain by selling them.165 
The tissue in Moore also differs from the placenta because placentas are 
                                                 
164 Moore v. Regents of University of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491–92 (Cal. 1990). 
165 The argument could be made that the woman could sell it and not violate the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act that prohibits the selling of organs, due to the lack of transplantation 
and the placenta’s regenerative nature, similar to blood and fecal matter. Id. at 505 n.5. Blood 
and fecal matter are sold throughout the United States and are deemed acceptable. Sophia 
Chase, The Bloody Truth: Examining America’s Blood Industry and its Tort Liability 
Through the Arkansas Prison Plasma Scandal, 3 WM. & MARY BUS. L.REV. 597, 602 (2012); 
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aspect of the argument is that the monetary benefit would have to be low enough not to entice 
people to get pregnant for the purpose of selling the placenta. Moore, 793 P.2d at 505 n.5. 
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excised through the birth of a child, not through surgery due to illness or 
research purposes. 
However, because of Moore’s quick disposition of property rights in 
excised cells, obtaining the placenta for personal use has proven difficult. 
Moore’s disposition disregarded the potential for a personal use interest in 
obtaining property rights, and now allows California, and any state following 
that precedent, to regulate these rights.166 But a disposition regulation should 
not so quickly stop the court from addressing the possibility of property rights 
without applying property justifications. A property interest can be greater 
than the policy reasons behind disposition regulations, especially when those 
policy reasons do not apply to the interest. 
The Moore court also contended that, by allowing a conversion issue 
to prevail, it would be admitting there is a property interest to vest in a 
person’s cells and tissues.167 By allowing this interest, the court believed 
patients would inundate the judicial system with conversion tort suits against 
the physicians and entities that make a profit on these cells.168 This in turn 
might have a devastating effect on medical research, creating great harm to 
the common good.169 Yet this is not the case. 
It can be assumed that most laypersons probably perceive they have 
an “interest” in their cells, which would still exist once the cells leave their 
body. In addition, the hospital already has the duty to disclose a fiduciary 
gain, and if an individual felt unenthusiastic about the idea of a hospital, 
university, or physician making large monetary gains from the patient’s cells 
or tissue, the patient would simply say no to the research. The court’s 
argument lacks support, as research is still alive and well, and other numerous 
patents have been created off other patients’ cell lines. It can also be assumed 
the cells and tissues were obtained through valid informed consent and 
disclosure of fiduciary gain. The court’s assumption was wrong. 
Justice Broussard made a similar argument in his concurring and 
dissenting opinion in Moore.170 If patients were compensated for their cells, 
they might be more inclined to consent to research treatment or participation, 
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instead of being resentful of the physician or entity’s fiduciary gains from the 
patient’s own cells.171 That in turn would provide even more opportunities 
for physicians and hospitals to further their research. 
Allowing property rights to vest in a woman’s placenta would not 
cause the demise of medical research. It would merely allow a personal use 
that should be granted to the woman if courts correctly applied the 
justifications for property laws. As Justice Mosk stated in his dissent, “[s]ince 
property or title is a complex bundle of rights, duties, powers and immunities, 
the pruning away of some or a great many of these elements does not entirely 
destroy the title.”172 
As Justice Mosk implied, limiting the bundle of sticks does not require the 
property right as a whole to be destroyed.173 The court’s articulation of the 
disposition policy reasons in Moore is correct, but courts need not destroy 
all the rights, just merely limit them. The same can be said with the 
placenta. The handling and disposition regulations are important to the use 
of the placenta. These regulations, however, should not disregard a 
woman’s interest to obtain her placenta for personal use. Moore’s holding 
has made it considerably more difficult, but not completely impossible, to 
obtain property rights in excised cells and tissues. Multiple courts have 
found means to grant quasi-property rights, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
3. Application of other case precedent. Hecht and York prove 
courts are willing to grant quasi-property rights in sperm174 and embryos.175 
The courts did not grant these rights because they determined the individuals 
possessed the rights in the sperm and embryo, but rather they depended on 
contract law to justify the rights bailment relationships.176 Also, since the 
material in Hecht contained gametes, that court considered it significant in 
the creation of life.177 This made the courts reluctant to make a distinguishing 
remark about the ownership of the material, but used it as a point to grant the 
                                                 
171 Id. at 504. 
172 Id. at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Walker 90 P.2d 854, 855 (1939)). 
173 Id. 
174 Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (1993). 
175 York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
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quasi-rights.178 The courts are achieving the correct result, but the method is 
skirting the true issue of people’s property rights in reproductive material, 
which in turn affects possessory rights of a placenta. 
Courts should continue to hold that a person has a property interest in 
reproduction-related excised tissue and cells and should include the placenta 
in this category by using Hecht and York as precedent. Even though the 
placenta would not usually be covered under contract law through a bailment 
relationship, the placenta is like the sperm and embryo, as it is composed of 
parts of the mother’s immunity and cell structure. It is genetically and 
immunologically the same as the fetus, it is embryonic in nature, and it is 
vital to fetus life.179 This comparison is important, as the court in Hecht 
discussed the composition of material and its potential to human life.180 Also 
important to the Hecht court was Davis’s holding granting quasi-property 
rights in the preembryo because of its “symbolic meaning to many people.”181 
This resembles the attitudes many cultures and women have towards the 
placenta. 
Although courts might not be convinced of the similarities that an 
embryo, sperm, and placenta possess, the placenta is distinguishable from 
other tissues, cells, and blood and should be considered a part of the 
reproductive material that has already obtained quasi-property rights. The 
placenta is considered a major endocrine organ, vital to fetal life.182 Through 
this application, the placenta can be classified as reproductive material, 
allowing the Hecht and York precedents to apply. By also applying the 
category property justifications, courts could extend quasi-property right to 
allow the woman to possess the majority of the control over the placenta.  
It is apparent there is a societal benefit of placentophagy, but it cannot 
be denied there is also a societal risk of unfettered access to the placenta. By 
limiting the rights through federal regulations and state statutes, society’s 
possible exposure risk to infectious material is reduced. The suggested 
limitations on placental property rights are detailed in the following section. 
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B. Federal Regulations and State Statutes 
A carve out in federal regulations and/or an enactment of state statutes 
for the placenta should be created to protect society from the risks 
surrounding careless handling of placentas. The carve out would specifically 
apply to the “regulated waste” section of OSHA. The main purpose of the 
OSHA regulation is to limit the exposure to infectious waste. To preserve the 
policy reason of the regulation and cultivate women’s property rights in the 
placenta, the carve out would limit the property rights, but not invalidate 
those rights entirely.183 While the three previously-mentioned states allow 
women to take their placentas, the statutes vary on the prior requirements 
needed for relinquishment.184 These variances result in inconsistencies. A 
carve out would limit inconsistencies and provide protection by requiring a 
blood test. If a state or entity did not require blood tests before 
relinquishment, infectious material could have the possibility of crossing 
state lines and increasing exposure to health risks. The employees of facilities 
that handle placentas and the public should be guarded against the possibility 
of an infection. Additionally, the carve out would provide proper guidance 
on how to implement procedures to reduce exposure while preserving the 
integrity of the placenta and its nutritional benefits.  
The carve out should provide an exemption to hospitals or birthing 
centers from using sterilization or incineration processes on placentas, if they 
are requested for personal use. Sterilization has an unknown effect on the 
nutrient value of the placenta and some women choose not to sterilize it 
during the preparation process.185 The exemption would be reliant on blood 
testing for HIV and hepatitis B diseases. If the patient’s blood test comes back 
negative, the placenta would not be considered infectious waste and could be 
relinquished. Fortunately, all of the enacted state statutes have blood tests as 
a part of their regulations.186 A state seeking to implement its own statutory 
allowance of a claim to a placenta should use a combination of the existing 
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statutes for the most unfettered access to the placenta while providing liability 
protection to the involved entities. 
Texas provides the best example of this type of statute.187 It requires 
blood testing of the two diseases OSHA is most concerned about—hepatitis 
B and HIV—as well as syphilis.188 Oregon adds the additional testing for 
hepatitis C, and includes room for whatever the state may later become 
concerned about.189 Hawaii is very general about the test performed, 
requiring it only to be negative for infection or hazard, but does not explicitly 
state what the infection or hazard may be.190 
Texas is the only state to specify that the placenta need not be 
disposed of as medical waste, unburdening the woman if there is unused 
placenta.191 Another important aspect of Texas’ statute is the protection it 
provides the hospitals or birthing centers, by specifying that hospitals and 
birthing centers cannot be liable under civil action, criminal proceedings, or 
administrative proceedings regarding placental release.192 One way the state 
mitigates the liability is by requiring a portion of placenta to be submitted for 
examination by pathology.193 As stated above, this examination allows the 
pediatrician to determine if the placenta sustained damage and in turn 
affected the baby, which could be mitigated through pediatric care.194 
A piece lacking in Texas’ statute is requirements upon the health care 
facility to implement safe handling and transportation procedures. Oregon 
and Hawaii possess this requirement in their statutes.195 A limitation that the 
Texas and Oregon statutes impose is on the selling of the placenta.196 
Acknowledgment of these requirements and procedures are documented in 
the patient’s chart, along with a signed form provided by the hospital.197 An 
important aspect of the form is patient acknowledgement that she has 
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received information about handling the placenta and its consumption.198 By 
using Texas’ statute as a foundation and including the referenced portions 
from Oregon and Hawaii, a newly drafted statute could give a woman access 
to her placenta and provide protection to the entities involved. The OSHA 
regulation or state statute changes would affect how hospitals handle the 
process of relinquishment of the placenta. 
C. Modification of Hospital Regulations 
Along with the proposed carve out in OSHA and possible state 
statutes, the HHS and CMS should provide guidance to the hospitals 
regarding the new regulations. Standardized guidance through HHS or CMS 
on proper handling of the placenta could provide a more systematic approach 
across the medical field. The guidance should address a variety of issues on 
the release of the placenta, which hospitals may have been dealing with over 
the years. With published guidance from these agencies, a physician might 
be more likely to be aware of and abide by the regulations. It would also help 
prevent the hospital from taking on a liability it is not aware of and would 
keep the hospital within OSHA compliance for the handling of infectious 
medical waste. 
In applying the property category justifications, there is enough 
reason to justify a property interest in the placenta. An argument might be 
made that Moore makes these property rights invalid. However, the analysis 
of the decision and application of the concurrence and dissent’s opinions 
provide a strong rebuttal that it would not apply to the placenta. Finally, after 
establishing property rights, it cannot be ignored that a societal interest exists 
in reducing the exposure to infectious diseases. This is reduced by creating a 
carve out in OSHA regulations or enacting state statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
 Through the ages, the placenta has been used for many cultural 
practices, including placentophagy. With an interest in the medicinal benefits 
of placentophagy, there is a renewed interest in the practice, which has 
increased the requests for the placenta after birth. This has created an 
inconsistency in hospital procedures, either requiring women to obtain court 
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orders to receive their placentas or forcing a physician to choose to bypass 
hospital regulations and give it directly to the patient. 
By allowing a property interest to attach to the placenta, the woman 
would have the freedom to exercise that right, if she determines she would 
like to partake in placentophagy for the betterment of her and her family. The 
courts could create property rights in the placenta through two ways: either 
by applying four of the five property categories to justify a property interest, 
or by using precedential reproductive cases to show that the placenta still 
holds the same qualities the courts have referenced in providing quasi-
property rights in sperm and embyros. 
Even though a defined property right would exist, the bundle of sticks 
should still be limited, due to societal risk of potential infectious diseases in 
the placenta. These risks can be managed through federal regulations and 
state statutes. Through the provided avenues, it would allow women to enjoy 
their right in the placenta and fully partake in placentophagy without undue 
legal hardship. 
